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Abstract— In this paper, we present a comunication-integrated
reinforcement-learning algorithm for a general-sum Markov
game or MG played by independent, cooperative agents. The
algorithm assumes that agents can communicate but do not
know the purpose (the semantic) of doing so. We model agents
that have different tasks, some of which may be commonly
beneficial. The objective of the agents is to determine which
are the commonly beneficial tasks, and learn a sequence of
actions that achieves the common tasks. In other words, the
agents play a multi-stagecoordination game, of which they know
niether the stage-wise payoff matrix nor the stage transition
matrix. Our principal interest is in imposing realistic conditions
of learning on the agents. Towards this end, we assume that they
operate in a strictly imperfect monitoring settingwherein they
do not observe one another’s actions or rewards. A learning
algorithm for a Markov game under this stricter condition of
learning has not been proposed yet to our knowledge. We describe
this Markov game with individual reward functions as a new
formalism, decentralized Markov gameor Dec-MG, a formalism
borrowed from Dec-MDP (Markov decison process). For the
communicatory aspect of the learning conditions, we propose
a series of communication frameworks graduated in terms of
facilitation of information exchange amongst the agents. We
present results of testing our algorithm in a toy problem MG
called a total guessing game.
I. I NTRODUCTION
A. Reinforcement learning
In reinforcement learning [1], an agent tries to learn the
optimal way of doing a task. In effect, the agent tries to do this
through maximizing a “reward” function, based on the reward
signal that emanates from the environment. The model of the
environment of the task is unknown to the agent. The model
of the task is a Markov decision process (MDP) [2]. The agent
collects experiences for the form< state, action, reward >,
and progressively finds the optimal action for each state. A
particular action executed in a state may be reinforced or not
by the reward that the environment gives the agent for doing
so. Thus the agent doesn’t learn the model of the system, but
learns policies of optimal behavior directly through experi-
ence. Q-learning [3] is a particularly interesting reinforcement
learning algorithm because it allows the agent to build up
the optimal policy while following a exploration-inclined sub-
optimal policy (it is thus an “off-policy” algorithm). The Q-
learning algorithm has been shown to converge to the optimal
policy after the agent has collected an adequate number of
experiences. For any given MDP, atleast one optimal reactive
policy of the form state → action, always exists [2]. It is
termed reactive since the optimal action is dependent solely
on current state, and not on history of past states and actions.
Other notable reinforcement learning algorithms include the
“on-policy” SARSA algorithm [1] and the gradient descent
algorithm VAPS [4].
Our interest is in extending reinforcement learning for tasks
controlled by more than one agent. Each agent acts indepen-
dently of others, but for optimal control, it must coordinate its
actions with those of other agents. The simplest extension of
the MDP control problem to multiple agents is the Multiple
MDP or MMDP framework [5]. However, the more general
framework for multiagent learning which captures the notion
on unequal rewards is the Markov game framework [6].
Making use of the Q-learning algorithm for parallel multi-
agent learning has now a considerable body of work behind it
( [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] to cite some examples). Since in these
works, Q-learning is directly transplanted to the multi-agent
setting, the conditions of learning are somewhat idealistic
in that each agent is able to observe which actions other
agents take and what rewards they receive. This assumption
is understandable since the focus of learning in these works
is what to learnand not reallyhow to learngiven the game-
theoretic notion of “rationality” assumed of each agent.
B. Multi-agent learning conditions
Assuming omniscient conditions of learning makes the
number of Q-values to learn exponential in the number of
agents. An experience for each agent becomes of the form<
s ate,
−→
A,
−→
R >, where the vectors are joint-actions and joint-
rewards respectively. From the perspective of a multi-agent
system it is more interesting to limit agents’ knowledge about
the workings of other agents. When agents don’t observe, at
any time t, the actions taken and the rewards received by
other agents, such a condition constitutes atrictly imper-
fect monitoring setting[11]. However, limiting each agent’s
view of other agents’ actions and rewards engenders the co-
assumption that each agent has only “partial” view of the state.
In other words, instead of knowing complete state information,
the agent receives a state-dependent observation, from which
it is required to deduce the actual state. The agent is no
longer operating a MDP but rather ap rtially observableMDP
or POMDP [12]. Under such a restriction, an agent cannot
Agent Actions Opera Baseball
Opera 3, 6 0, 0
Baseball 0, 0 6, 3
TABLE I
REWARD MATRIX FOR THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME
Agent Actions Opera Cinema Baseball
Opera 3, 6 0, 0 0, 0
Cinema 0, 0 6, 6 0, 0
Baseball 0, 0 0, 0 6, 3
TABLE II
REWARD MATRIX FOR A MODIFIED BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME
form optimal reactive policies because of the state-observation
aliasing; it must instead learn history-based policies [13]. Even
when the model of the system is known, finding multi-agent
optimal policies for POMDPs is an NEXP-complete problem
[14]. A slightly complexity alleviating condition of multi-agent
learning is partial observability with joint full-observability,
wherein the pooled observations of all agents do give the actual
state of the system.
Thus to summarize, we are interested in independents agents
learning reactive polices for cooperation on a task under the
two conditions,
• They operate in a strictly imperfect monitoring setting
• In each state, they have partial observability individually
and full observability jointly
We propose a new formalism for describing multi-agent tasks
that we target, that differs slightly from previous formulations.
We call this new framework adecentralized Markov game
or Dec-MG. It is similar to the Dec-MDP framework of [14]
differing in the reward function; in Dec-MDP each agent
receives the same reward, while in a Dec-MG this is not
necessarily so.
C. Cooperation amongst agents
Our focus in this paper is on the modality of learning.
We wish to approach multi-agent learning by imposing the
above-stated learning conditions on a given class of Markov
game problems. By doing so, we are specifying the general
objective of the agents and proposing a learning mechanism
which would teach the agents the right policies. So, our focus
is on how to learn, rather thanwhat to learn. In particular,
we are interested incoordinationMarkov games. These have
been studied in a perfect monitoring, fully-observable setting
in [15]. Such games typically contain multiple Nash equilibria,
and the problem is of aligning agents to choose one of them.
A dilemma is created because not all agents might profit
equally in all the equilibria (Table I). However, if the game
provides aPareto-optimalNash equilibrium, satisfiability of
all agents can be targeted. Attaining such an equilibrium is
termed “optimal coordination” (Table II).
Hence the learning problem is two-fold,(a) detection of this
equilibrium and(b) finding agent policies to achieve it. In a
Markov game (or multi-stage game), played by n agents and
with a state setS, the coordination condition is facilitated as
follows. Each agenti has a set of desirable states called a
goal set,Ψi ⊂ S. Attaining any state in the goal set (a goal
state) gives the agent its maximum reward. For an agent, its
goal states are identical in that they give the agent the same
maximum reward. However, different agents have different
goal sets. All goal states i.e.,(Ψabs = Ψ1
⋃
Ψ2
⋃
. . .
⋃
Ψn)
terminate the game. The condition that provides a Pareto-
optimal Nash equilibrium is thatΨ = (Ψ1
⋂
Ψ2
⋂
. . .
⋂
Ψn)
is non-empty. This set is the common goal set, and its
elements, common goals. All goals that are not common are
private goals. Agenti’s private goals areΨi − Ψ. Thus, the
objective of the agents is to learn policies that attain common
goals while avoiding private goals. Thus we add another
learning condition,
• Atleast one Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium exists for
(each stage of) the Markov game.
D. Inter-agent communication
With the strict conditions of learning as stated above, our
interest is in studying how agents can learn to cooperate if
communication amongst them were possible. In other words,
how can agents learn to use a communication faculty, if it
were made available, in order to learn coordination of actions
for the “real” task (as opposed to the incidental task of learn-
ing to communicate). When information-exchange is possible
amongst agents, several issues arise and can be addressed; we
point to the following:
• Do agents know the purpose of communication?
• Do the agents use the same language (or protocol) to
communicate?
• What do the agents communicate?
In this paper, we respond to these issues as follows: we
suppose that agents do not know the purpose of communi-
cation a priori (see [16] for a counter-example), agents use
the same language to communicate ( [17] assumes agents
use different languages) and finally, we contend that agents
transmit “null” impulses rather than content-based messages
as in [18] or [19]. We thus propose three communication
frameworks based on these features where each framework is
more sophisticated than the previous one. We integrate these
frameworks with the Q-learning algorithm and propose a new
action-value update rule to take into account communication
received and sent. This algorithm is meant for multi-agent
learning of coordination for a given Markov game under the
said learning conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we describe the Dec-Markov game (Dec-MG) framework
alongwith related frameworks as well as the basic Q-learning
algorithm. In section III, we state our communication frame-
works, and in section IV, we present their integration with Dec-
MG. Section V contains our communication-based multi-agent
algorithm, followed by results of experiments and testing in
section VI. We close with a discussion on this work in section
VII.
II. TASK FRAMEWORK
A. MDP and Q-learning
A Markov decision process is a four-tuple< S,A, T, R >.
• S, is a set of states.
• A, is a set of actions.
• T (s, a, s′), is the state transition function, which gives the
probability of moving to state s’ from state s on taking
action a,s, s′ ∈ S, a ∈ A.
• R(s, a), is the reward function, which gives the reward (
a real number) of taking action a in state s,s ∈ S, a ∈ A.
In reinforcement learning, the agent doesn’t knowT and R.
When using Q-learning [3], the agent learns Q-values denoted
as Q(s, a), which represent the long-term value of taking action
a in state s. The agent gathers experiences of the form<
s, a, r, s′ >, and updates the concerned Q-value as follows:
Q(s, a)← (1− α)Q(s, a) + α(r + γmaxa′Q(s′, a′)) (1)
whereα is the learning rate andγ, the discount-factor. When
Q-learning is used for multi-agent learning, the equation above
changes to (for each agent i),
Qi(s,
−→
A )← (1−α)Qi(s,
−→
A )+α(r+γoperator−→
A′
Qi(s′,
−→
A′))
(2)−→
A is the joint-action. Since the updates are done independently
by each agent i, themax operator cannot be employed. Some
other, appropriate operator must be identified and used. For
instance, in [7], the NashQ operator based on Nash equilib-
rium, is used, while in [9], an operator based on correlated
equilibrium is used. In our approach we assume that the joint-
action is not observable, and hence we are interested in the
first form of Q-learning.
Algorithm 1 Single agent Q-learning
∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A, Q(s, a)← 0.
Initialize system state tos.
(for each episode)
repeat
Choose actiona ∈ A using a policy derived fromQ
(ε− greedy, for example).
Execute chosen actiona.
Observe rewardr and next states′.
Q(s, a)← (1− α)Q(s, a) + α(r + γmaxa′Q(s′, a′))
s← s′
until s is terminal
Output: The agent constructs a reactive policy such that
∀s, π(s)← maxaQ(s, a)
B. Decentralized Markov game (Dec-MG) for multi-agent
control
In this section, we describe our framework for modeling
multi-agent control of a task. We adapt the decentralized
Markov decision process (Dec-MDP) framework described in
[14] toward this end. We make one notable change to it:
agents have individual reward functions rather than one
common reward function. We call this different framework
as a decentralized Markov game or Dec-MG.
• n is the number of agents involved.
• S is the set of system states.
• A = A1 × A2 × . . . × An is the set of joint-actions.Ai
is the set of agent i’s actions.
• Ri(s, a) is a rational representing the reward agent i
obtains if agents take joint-action a in states. a ∈ A,
s ∈ S. There are thus n reward functions.
• T (s, a1, . . . , an, s
′
), the state transition function gives the
probability of transitioning to states
′
from states if
joint action < a1, . . . , an > is taken.s, s
′ ∈ S. We are
considering a deterministic system, hence T’s values are
from {0, 1}.
• Ω is the set of observations.
• O(a1, . . . , an, o1, . . . , on, s), the observation function
gives the probability of agent i receiving observation
oi ∈ Ω, if the agents take joint action< a1, . . . , an >
and the system moves to states ∈ S as a result.
• There exists a mappingJ(o1, . . . , on), for each tuple of n
observations, one observation per agent, to a unique state
s ∈ S. Joint full-observability implies that at any time, if
agents pool their observations, they can obtain the system
state.
Note: If the observation received in each state is unique, then
the Dec-MG reduces to a Markov game or MG [6] and it is
defined as above.
In reinforcement learning, as stated before, the agent gathers
experiences of a given form during learning. Usually, the
experience gathering is divided intoepisodes. An episode ends
when the agent enters a goal state (also called an absorbing
state). The Q-value updates made during an episode are used in
the next episode. The agents’ goals are implicit through their
reward functions. Just to be precise, we make the following
designations:
• Ψi(⊂ S) is agenti’s goal set.
• Ψ = (Ψ1
⋂
Ψ2
⋂
. . .
⋂
Ψn) is the common goal set.
• ΨAbs = (Ψ1
⋃
Ψ2
⋃
. . .
⋃
Ψn) is the absorbing state set.
• Ψ,ΨAbs 6= ∅ (this expresses the condition for permitting
cooperation)
III. T HE COMMUNICATION FRAMEWORKS
In this section, we describe a graduated series of communi-
cation frameworks. The problem with incorporating an express
communication framework in a Markov game is that such
an addition can be objected to as being purely prescriptive
in nature. In other words, with the defined communication
facility at their disposal, the agents would play a transformed,
potentially simpler Markov game that might not address all
the issues raised by the original game. It is thus important to
remain limited in defining the communication framework. The
frameworks that we propose are ordered by their increasing
formativeness. Each framework proposed is seen as logical
addendum to its predecessor. At the zeroth level is the Dec-
MG itself as described in the previous section.
A. Nomenclature and Description of Gradation
Below, we describe three concepts on which we base our
frameworks, namely, null message, sender and directedness:
• Null message. The simplest idea of communication is that
a message< sender, message− content > is received
by an agent. However, even simpler than this form would
be content-less messages. This is form we consider.
We term messages of this sort as null messages. Null
messages allow us to avoid any arbitrary normativeness
of message-content and hence of the communication
framework. Null messages can be represented just by
< sender >. For the rest of the paper, we refer to null
messages as simply messages.
• Sender. This represents the identity of the message-
sending agent. Agents are uniquely numbered. If there are
more than one agents that send a null message (to some
agent) then ‘sender’ is a tuple containing each sending
agent’s identity (for e.g.,< 4, 1, 3, . . . >). Sender also
serves another purpose. Suppose our agents are nameless
(i.e., without identity numbers) and we are interested in
indicating that a certain agent receives a message. Then
sender could take just binary values, 0 indicating no
message received and 1 indicating otherwise.
• Directedness. This is the degree of informativeness the
communication framework supports. We consider three
values of directedness, 1, 2 and 3. These categories
of directedness, in fact, define the three communication
frameworks that we study in this paper. They will be
called frameworks 1, 2 and 3 accordingly, or F1, F2 and
F3 in short. The Dec-MG without any communication
framework is F0.
F1 Broadcast, anonymous, idempotent messages. All
agents receive a sent message (broadcast). Agents
cannot identify themselves while sending messages
(anonymous), and two or more messages sent at
the same time to some agent, appear to be just
one message (idempotent). Sender takes values from
{0,1}.
F2 Broadcast, identifiable messages. All agents receive
a sent message (broadcast). Messages received con-
tain the id (or ids) of sending agents (identifiable).
Once messages can be identified, the property of
idem potency disappears. Sender’s value can be a
combination of any size from 0 to n - 1, of the
agents ids.
F3 Non-broadcast, identifiable messages. Agents can
choose the recipient agents of their messages (non-
broadcast), and messages received contain the ids
of sending agents (identifiable). Sender’s values are
same as in F2.
IV. COMMUNICATION -EXTENDED DEC-MG FRAMEWORK
We now describe what additions to the Dec-MG framework
the three communication frameworks F1, F2 and F3 entail. We
note that the functionsT , J andRis do not change in any of
the additions given below. We shall see that F1 and F2 have the
same action set, while F2 and F3 have the same observation
set. F3 has the mostpersonalizedobservation function.
A. Dec-MG with F1
F1 messages are broadcast, anonymous and idempotent.
• AFi = Ai × {0, 1} is the agent i’s augmented action set.
It is the cross-product of the action set with a binary set,
indicating that each action inAi can now be exercised
either with (1) or without (0) the sending of a message.
Actions are thus tuples of the form< a, x >, x being 0
or 1.
• AF = AF1 ×AF2 × . . .×AFn is the joint-action set.
• ΩF = Ω × {0, 1} is the enlarged observation set from
which all agents receive observations. Under F1, any ob-
servation ino ∈ Ω can (1) or cannot (0) be accompanied
by a message. Observations are thus tuples of the form
< o, y >, y being 0 or 1.
• OF (< a1, x1 >, . . . , < an, xn >,< o1, y >, . . . , <
on, y >, s) is the observation function that gives observa-
tionso1, . . . , on according toO when agents take actions
a1, . . . , an, and makesy = 1 iff ∃xi = 1, elsey equals 0.
This indicates that if any agent sends a message with an
action a (by settingx to 1), all agents receive the message
(y equals 1) along with the original observation as given
by O. The system moves to states ∈ S according toO
as before.
B. Dec-MG with F2
F2 messages are broadcast and identifiable.
• Agents are numbered from 1 to n.
• AFi s,A
F are the same as in F1.
• ΩF = Ω × (
⋃n
i=1 C
n
i + {0}). Since messages are iden-
tifiable, each observation can be accompanied a tuple of
up to size n, identifying the senders of the messages.
These tuples form a union of set of combinations, from
sizes 0 to n, of agent ids.{0} indicates that no message
was received. Observations are thus tuples of the form
< o,−→y >, −→y being a tuple of any size from 1 to n.
• OF (< a1, x1 >, . . . , < an, xn >,< o1,−→y >, . . . , <
on,
−→y >, s) is the observation function that gives ob-
servationso1, . . . , on according toO when agents take
actionsa1, . . . , an, and
−→y is the tuple
⋃n
i=1 i iff xi = 1.
All agents receive a tuple of senders’ identities (the tuple
−→y ) along with the original observation as given byO.
The system moves to states ∈ S according toO as
before.
C. Dec-MG with F3
F3 messages are non-broadcast and identifiable.
• Agents are numbered from 1 to n.
• AFi = Ai × (
⋃n
i=1 C
n
i + {0}) is the agent i’s augmented
action set. It is the cross-product of the action set with
a union of sets that contain combinations of different
sizes, of agents ids. Actions are thus tuples of the form
< a,−→x >, −→x being a tuple of any size from 1 to n,
containing the ids of agents to which the message is
addressed.{0} indicates that no message is being sent.
• AF = AF1 ×AF2 × . . .×AFn is the joint-action set.
• ΩF is as in F2.
• OF is as in F2, except that the value of tuple−→y received
with each observation may be different for different
agents. Each agent’s−→y will contain ids of only those
agents who have sent it a message. Thus messages are
not broadcast.
V. THE LEARNING ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe a Q-learning based algorithm
for the Dec-MG under a communication framework. It is
appellatedReinforcement by Messages. It is applicable to
all the discussed communication frameworks. As we have
stated earlier, we are interested in finding reactive policies
of the form π : Ω → A (i.e., the optimal action based only
on current observation). With our communication framework
in place, we wish to generate optimal policies of the form
πi : (ΩF )→ (AF ). Such a policy tells agent i which action to
take, whom to send a message to on receiving an observation
or an observation with a message. Thus agents learn Q-values
of the form Qi(< o, y >, < a, x >), where y, x could be
single values or tuples depending on the framework. Agents
are independent learners, hence each agents uses and updates
its own Q-values. In the algorithm,
• λi denotes an observation-message tuple< o, y >.
• µi denotes an action-message tuple< a, x >.
• Xi denotes the number of agents to which messages were
sent; in the case of F1 and F2, this isn. For F3, this is
the length of the tuple−→x .
• Yi denotes the number of agents from which messages
were received; in the case of F1, this isn. For F2 and
F3 this is the length of the tuple−→y .
• α is the learning rate andγ is the discount factor.
A. Central principle of the algorithm
The algorithm’s main difference with Q-learning is in the
way it utilizes the obtained rewards. It works as follows: Each
agent puts the reward received from the environment in two
components. The first component is then gativeof the envi-
ronment reward. Reinforcing actions by negating environment
rewards, just in itself, would result in an agent learning to
avoid all goals. However, each agent doesn’t wish to avoid
all goals, merely those that are not common. To seek out the
common goals, the agents calculate a second, compensatory
component. This is anamplification of the reward received
from the environment by a factor of the number of agents
contacted (either through sending or receiving messages). One
way of interpreting such a form of compensation is that,
agents are seeking to confirm from one another, the worth
of any individual action. One might say that the purpose
of communication is implicit in the reward function. Thus
the compensation for the negative reward is sought in the
communication framework. The idea is the amplification will
completelyoffset the earlier negativeness. In this way, agents
Algorithm 2 Reinforcement by Messages
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: ∀λ ∈ ΩF , ∀µ ∈ AF , Qi(λ, µ)← 0.
3: end for
4: (for each episode)
5: System state is initialized tos
6: ∀i, agenti observation is initialized toλi according toJ
ands.
7: repeat
8: ∀i, Agent i chooses actionµi ∈ AFi using a policy
derived fromQi (ε− greedy, for example).
9: ∀i, Agent i executes chosen actionµi.
10: System state s is updated to s
′
according to
T (s, µ1(a), . . . , µn(a), s
′
)
11: Agent observations are given according to
OF (µ1(a), . . . , µn(a), λ
′
1, . . . , λ
′
n, s
′
).
12: for i = 1 to n do
13: Agent i observes rewardri and gets observationλ
′
i.
14: rprivi ← −ri.
15: rmessi ← ri(Xi + Yi).
16: Qi(λi, µi)← (1−α)Qi(λi, µi) + α[rprivi + rmessi +
γmaxµ′i
Qi(λ
′
i, µ
′
i)].
17: end for
18: until s ∈ ΨAbs
19: Output: Each agenti constructs a reactive policy such that
∀λ, πi(λ)← maxµQi(λ, µ)
calculate a virtual reward as a function of the actual reward
received (This is similar to the principle of reward interpreta-
tion [20], wherein virtual rewards are supplied, in addition to
actual ones, to speed up learning).
Following this logic, when all agents are in any common
goal state, each agent will prefer to send a message to all
other agents to extract maximum compensation. If such is the
case, each agent will also receive messages from all agents,
further adding to its compensation. This is the idea behind
reinforcement by messages. In a private-goal state, an agent
may not, in general, receive messages, and thus will obtain less
reward. We contend that the algorithm is capable of making
agents prefer common goals over private goals, but it cannot
cope with the related objective i.e., making agents prefer non
goals over private goals. The second objective would permit
the game to continue, and increase the chance of agents finding
a common goal.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
A. Testbed problem
For testing our approach, we have formulated a simpletotal
guessing game that simulates a Dec-MG in a strictly imperfect
monitoring setting. Each agent contributes a number to a total.
Some totals give high reward, while others give low reward.
Some of the high rewarding totals are common to all agents.
However, agents don’t know the reward function, and hence
hey are unawarea priori of the good totals (thus in effect,
Fig. 1. Percent optimal coordination (four agents)
the reward function is defined over observations, rather than
states). Moreover, agents cannot see each other’s contributions,
only the total. An agent can reduce or increase its contribution
(within a range). Agents thus keep changing their contributions
until the total satisfies at least one agent, at which point the
game terminates. The objective of the agents is to learn to
attain a total that satisfies all the agents. In this game,
• State of the system is the configuration of contributions
of all the agents.
• Totals correspond to observations.
• A, an integer, is the maximum possible increase or
decrease in an agent’s contributions, and hence an agent’s
actions are integers from the interval[−A,A].
We conducted simulations of this game under four conditions:
• F0 with full observability of state. It implies in fact a
MG. We still assumed that agents do not observe each
others actions or rewards. The algorithm we use for this
condition is single agent Q-learning.
• Dec-MG with F1, F2 and F3 in an imperfectly monitoring
setting using the Reinforcement by Messages algorithm.
Each game involved 4 agents and 400000 episodes. Goal totals
gave a reward of 10 while other totals reward -2.
B. Results
Fig. 1 shows the results for a game where there was 1
common goal, and 1 private goal per agent. Using F1, agents
attain optimal coordination comparable to F0. F2 outperforms
all. F2 gives better results that F1 since the update rule uses
the exact number of senders rather than an arbitrary number.
F2 gives better results that F3 (in which the update rule
has more information) because in F3, an agent can claim
more reward by sending a message than in F2 or F1. This
implies that an agent may still find private goals attractive
(by sending “useless” messages) and pursue them resulting in
lesser optimal coordination.
If we make the the reward function more precise over the
states, i.e., the high reward is given not just for a particular
Fig. 2. Average episode length (four agents)
total, but its constituent contributions too, then under all
the four conditions, optimal (100 percent) coordination is
reached after just a small number of episodes. In Fig 2.,
the number of steps taken per episode to achieve optimal
coordination when rewards are state-based, is shown. As can
be remarked, coordination is achieved much quicker since the
rewards given are more consistent, and agents can update their
actions with more surety. We notice also that F2 and F3 the
most number of steps to achieve optimal coordination. This is
understandable given that agents have a much higher number
of actions (basic actions + communication actions) over which
to coordinate. Agents could be said to be waiting for the right
message from the right agent. The fact that F1 gives the fastest
convergence indicates that our reward interpretation rule is
valid and effective. F1 has double the number of actions than
F0.
VII. C ONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a new approach to integrat-
ing communication into Markov games. As compared to pre-
vious endeavours of such nature, our approach is less ad-hoc
in that niether do we attach anysemanticto the message (such
as exchange of state or observation information, or proposed
action information) nor do we propose explicit rules indicating
why the agent must communicate. Agents learn the virtue of
communicating (as indeed of remaining silent) based on the
basic reward that is inbuilt into the task they are supposed to do
together. We have introduced a new reward interpretation rule
that allows agents to test out all combinations of actions and
communication acts, and choose the optimal, even when they
do not observe the actions of other agents. We have proposed
three rudimentary communication frameworks, each one of
them a logical addendum to its predecessor, and proposed
a new learning algorithm based on Q-learning, that teaches
agents when to communicate, with whom and with what basic
action. We have shown that for coordination Markov games,
our algorithm performs better than independent learner Q-
learning with full observability in terms of percentage optimal
coordination and episode length. We haven’t included results
from joint-action Q-learning here, but we note that joint-action
learners perform only marginally better than independent-
learners. See [15], for results on single-stage games.
In the future, we intend to continue this line of thought
in studying related phenomena such as coalition formations,
framework preference (with regards to attached costs), com-
petitive games (where agents are non-cooperative), and more
sophisticated reward interpretation rules.
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